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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a case involving a son suing his elderly parents for substantial financial damages for 
losses he aUegedly sustained when his father sold an unprofitable car dealership to a third party. 
Plaintiffi' Appellant R. Drew Thomas (hereinafter "Plaintiff') brought suit against his elderly parents 
Defendants/Respondents Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas (hereinafter "Ron" and "Elaine," 
or collectively "Defendants") to recover damages that Plaintiff allegedly incurred upon the sale of 
Defendants' car dealership. Plaintiffs original Complaint alleged five separate causes of action 
against Defendants. As set forth below, the only substantive cause of action at issue in this appeal 
is a claim by Plaintifffor unjust enrichment based upon the theory of quasi-contract. For the reasons 
set forth herein, the Court should affirm the District Court's rulings in all respects. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
The course of proceedings described in Appellant's Briefis substantially accurate. Plaintiff 
filed his original Complaint in this matter on June 21, 2006. R. Vol. I, p.23. In his Complaint, 
Plaintiff alleged five causes of action against Defendants. Each cause of action was based upon the 
failure of Defendants to transfer a car dealership owned by Defendants to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges 
that the car dealership should have been transferred to him, rather than sold to an unrelated 
investment group. R. Vol. I, p.23 - p.32. The causes of action alleged by Plaintiff included Breach 
of Contract (oral); Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; Quasi-Contract; 
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Breach of Contract (in the alternative); and, Fraud. Id. Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs 
Complaint and denied all substantive allegations enumerated by Plaintiff. R. Vol. I, p.34 - p.38. 
On July 24, 2007, approximately one year after Plaintiff filed his Complaint, Defendants 
moved the District Court for summary judgment on each of Plaintiffs five causes of action. R. Vol. 
I, p.140. Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. On October 
11,2007, the District Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Tr. Vol. I, p.l - p.94. On November 26, 2007, the District Court issued its Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. IV, p.742. The District Court granted part of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied part of Defendants' Motion. 
Specifically, the District Court denied Defendants' motion as it related to Plaintiffs causes 
of action for Breach of Contract (oral) and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing. R. Vol. IV, p.752 - p.753. The District Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs causes of action for Quasi-Contract, Breach of Contract (in the alternative), and Fraud. 
R. Vol. IV, p.753 - p.759. Following the District Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff proceeded with the prosecution of his remaining claims for Breach of 
Contract (oral) and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
After further discovery, on March 18,2008, Defendants moved the District Court for partial 
summary judgment on one specific aspect of Plaintiffs remaining claims. R. Vol. IV, p.739. 
Defendants requested that the District Court find, as a matter of law, that the agreement (if any) 
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between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding the transfer of the car dealership to Plaintiff, did not 
include the transfer of any real property owned by Defendants. R Vol. IV, p.739 - p.740. On May 
19,2008, the District Court granted Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R Vol. IV, 
p.795 - R. Vol. V, p.804. The District Court found that any promise or agreement to transfer the car 
dealership to Plaintiff did not and could not include an agreement or promise to transfer any real 
property. Id. 
On April 9, 2009, Defendants again moved the District Court for snmmary judgment on 
Plaintiff's remaining claims for Breach of Contract (oral) and Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing. R Vol. V, p.957. Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Second Motion for 
Snmmary Judgment. On May 7, 2009, the District Court heard oral argument on Defendant's 
Motion. Tr. Vol. I, p.95 - p.132. On May 18,2009, the District Court entered its Order granting 
Defendants' Second Motion for Snmmary Judgment. R. Vol. VI., p.l075. The District Court 
determined that the parties had not entered into a valid or enforceable contract for the transfer the 
car dealership from Defendants to Plaintiff. Accordingly, the District Court granted Defendants' 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's remaining causes of action for 
Breach of Contract (oral) and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. R. 
Vol. VI, p. 1085 - p.l 086. Upon the dismissal of these claims, Plaintiff no longer retained any 
causes of action against Defendants. 
Following the dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims, Defendants filed a Motion for Award of 
3 
Attorney's Fees and Costs. R. Vol. VI, p.1088 - p.1132. Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed 
various briefs in opposition. On June 22, 2009 the District Court heard oral argument on 
Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Tr. Vol. I, p.134 - p.l61. On July 31, 
2009, the District Court entered an Order On Plaintiff s Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees, wherein 
the District Court awarded Defendants costs in the amount of $2,334.81, and attorney fees in the 
amount of$115,749.20. R. Vol. VI, p.1169 - p.1178. On August 19, 2009, Judgment was entered 
in favor of Defendants for $118,084.01. R. Vol. VI, p.l166 - p.l167. 
On August 27, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal, which sought appellate review of 
several of the District Court's rulings. R. Vol. VI, p.1183 - p.1187. Upon the filing of his brief, 
Plaintiff limited his appeal to the District Court's rulings relative to Plaintiffs unjust enrichment 
claim and the award of Defendants' attorney's fees. It is important to note that the District Court 
dismissed Plaintiff s claims for Breach of Contract (oral); Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing; Breach of Contract (in the alternative); and, Fraud. Plaintiff did not appeal 
any of these rulings by the District Court. Accordingly, for all purposes relating to this appeal, it is 
now conclusively established that Plaintiff never had a valid and enforceable contract with 
Defendants for the transfer of Defendants' car dealership to Plaintiff. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The only substantive issue appealed by Plaintiff is whether the District Court erred in 
dismissing Plaintiff s claim for unjust enrichment. The crux of Plaintiff s claim is that Plaintiffhad 
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an implied-in-fact contract (or quasi-contract) with Defendants, pursuant to which Plaintiff provided 
services to Defendants that unjustly enriched Defendants. In the proceedings below, the District 
Court determined that an express employment contract existed between Plaintiff and Defendants and, 
as a result, a cause of action for unjust enrichment against Defendants could not stand. As a result, 
the only facts that are truly relevant to this appeal are those facts surrounding the express 
employment agreements between Plaintiff and Defendants. If an express employment agreement 
exists between Plaintiff and Defendant, then the District Court's ruling must be affirmed. 
Nonetheless, a little bit of background information will be helpful to the Court in providing the 
foundation for the employment agreements between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
Prior to the events alleged in Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendant Ron Thomas had worked in 
the business of selling cars for the better part of 30 years in Emmett, Idaho. R. Vol. I, p.I72. Ron 
worked as a salesman for Johannsen Motors in Emmett for approximately 26 years until about 1995. 
fd. In approximately 1995, Ron purchased some real property in Emmett and opened np his own 
used car sales business called "Lot of Cars." fd. Within a couple of years of opening "Lot of Cars," 
the owner of Johannsen Motors, for whom Ron had previously worked, approached Ron about the 
possibility of purchasing Johannsen Motors. fd. Ron eventnally agreed to purchase Johannsen 
Motors. fd. Defendants Ron and Elaine Thomas purchased Johannsen Motors in 1997. fd. Shortly 
after the purchase of Johannsen Motors, Defendants became approved franchisees of Dodge and 
Chrysler for new car sales. R. Vol. I, p.l72 - p. 173. Following the franchise approval, Defendants 
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renamed the new car dealership "Thomas Motors." fd.; R. Vol. II, p.343. 
According to Plaintiff, at the time that Defendants were contemplating buying Johannsen 
Motors, Ron approached Plaintiff about the prospect of going to work for the car dealership as a 
sales manager. R. Vol. II, p.281 - p. 282. At that time, Plaintiff was working for Lanny Berg 
Chevrolet New and Used Car Dealership in Caldwell, Idaho. fd. Plaintiff had been working for 
Lanny Berg for approximately 8 years, primarily as a salesman. R. Vol. II, p.276. For the last six 
months of his employment at Lanny Berg, Plaintiff testified he worked as a new car sales manager. 
R. Vol. II, p.277. 
Plaintiff further claims that he and Ron had a number of discussions prior to the purchase of 
Johannsen Motors regarding the the prospect of Plaintiff going to work for Ron at the new car 
dealership. R. Vol. II, p.281 - p.282. The substance of these discussions, as alleged by Plaintiff, was 
that Ron told Plaintiff that if Plaintiff came to work for Ron's new car dealership, upon Ron's 
retirement, at or about 63 years old, the dealership would be transferred to Plaintiff. I fd. Plaintiff 
testified that Ron specifically told Plaintiff that the, "dealership would be yours." R. Vol. II, p.283. 
Plaintifftestified that he agreed to leave Lanny Berg and to work for Ron at the new car dealership 
in the Fall of 1997. R. Vol. II, p.279. 
'Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff are disputed by Defendants. The testimony of 
Plaintiff and Defendant Ron Thomas is often diametrically opposed. However, for purposes of 
this appeal, as with the various motions for summary judgment before the District Court below, 
any time that there is a factual dispute between Plaintiffs testimony and Ron's testimony, 
Defendants will cite to Plaintiffs version of the facts so that the Court is presented with the 
undisputed facts so that the record may be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
6 
Plaintiff testified that his agreement to leave Lanny Berg, and to go to work for Ron's new 
business, was communicated to Ron "a month or two" before he actually started working there. R. 
Vol. II, p.288. It is undisputed that none of the discussions regarding Plaintiffs role with Thomas 
Motors were reduced to writing at that point in time. ld. 
Plaintiff alleges that he and Ron carne to an oral agreement sometime in 1997 regarding the 
transfer of the dealership, which would occur at some point in the future. R. Vol. II, p. 283. The 
terms of the alleged oral agreement that Plaintiff claims he reached with his dad in 1997 were 
extremely vague. ld. The "agreement" consisted almost entirely of Ron's simple statement to 
Plaintiff that "the dealership will be yours" in about 8 years. fd. Plaintiff acknowledged the 
vagueness of this alleged agreement with his own testimony: 
Q. Okay. And, of course, you remember I got into this before too, trying 
to get the specifics of the words used that you can recall that 
constituted the deal. And I think we've already covered that, right? 
A. As good as I believe we can, I suppose. 
Q. Okay. And as I understand the substance of what you said, you 
understood essentially the terms of the deal were that your dad said, 
'If you come to join Thomas Motors as the general manager, the 
dealership will be yours when I retire at or about 63 years old'; is that 
a fair statement? 
A. 1'd say that's fair. 
R. Vol. II, p. 288. Thus, the oral agreement that served as the primary basis for Plaintiffs original 
claims in this lawsuit was not specific in its terms. Due to the vague nature ofthe alleged agreement, 
the District Court ruled that the oral agreement to transfer ownership of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff 
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failed to contain a number of essential and material terms. R. Vol. VI, p.l075 - p. 1087. 
Accordingly, the District Court ruled that no enforceable contract for the transfer of Thomas Motors 
ever existed. Id Plaintiff did not appeal this ruling by the District Court; therefore, for purposes of 
this appeal, it has been established that no enforceable agreement for the transfer of the car 
dealership ever existed. 
Notwithstanding the District Court's ruling, one of Plaintiff's primary factual allegations in 
his Brief is that Ron agreed to "give" the car dealership to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's assertion that Ron 
agreed to "give" the dealership to Plaintiff, is not a fair or accurate representation of Plaintiff's own 
testimony regarding the alleged agreement. The uncontroverted evidence is that Plaintiff knew that 
ifhe wanted the dealership, he would have to buy it from Ron. R. Vol. II, p.298. Plaintiff repeatedly 
testified that Ron never expressed any kind of intention, in any of their discussions, that Ron would 
literally "give" the business to Plaintiff. R. Vol. II, p.294. In the words of Plaintiff: 
Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I was going 
to get this place for free. That never crossed by mind that 1'd ever get 
it for free. 
R. Vol. II, p.294. Plaintiff further testified: "I never thought I would get it for free. I knew I would 
have to pay something for it." R. Vol. II, p.298 (emphasis added). 
According to Plaintiff, when Ron allegedly told him that if Plaintiff came to work for Ron 
in the summer of 1997 that at Ron's retirement some 8 years later "the dealership would be yours", 
Plaintiff understood that he was going to have to pay for Thomas Motors. Plaintiff and Ron did not 
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discuss or reach an agreement on what the price of the dealership would be: 
Q. You at least understood that you wouldn't be getting the business for 
nothing, but there was no specific discussion about what you would 
have to pay? 
A. Correct. 
R. Vol. II, p.299 (emphasis added). 
The above-quoted testimony was offered by Plaintiff in a deposition taken on June 26, 2007. 
Id. After Defendants filed for summary judgment the first time, Plaintiff filed an opposing affidavit 
with the Court that largely contradicted Plaintiff s own deposition testimony regarding whether 
Plaintiff would be required to purchase the dealership, or whether Ron would merely "give" him the 
dealership. R. Vol. III, p.415 - p.425. In order to clarify Plaintiffs own contradictory testimony, 
Defendants took a second deposition of Plaintiff. R. Vol. V, p.993. Throughout his sworn testimony 
in his second deposition, Plaintiff again reiterated the position taken by him in his first deposition, 
that not only would he not simply be "given" Thomas Motors, Plaintiff would be required to 
purchase Thomas Motors from Defendants. R. VoL V, p. 997 - p.1000. 
Plaintiff acknowledged that at no point did Ron ever indicate, infer, suggest or agree that the 
plaintiff would not have to pay some form of compensation for getting the business. R. Vol. V, 
p.997. Plaintiff testified that Ron, consistently and without exception, indicated that Ron needed to 
get something financial out of the business in order for him and his wife to live on during their 
retirement years. R. Vol. V, p.998 - p.lOOO. In other words, the alleged agreement to transfer 
Thomas Motors to Plaintiff consisted of a promise by Defendants to sell Thomas Motors to Plaintiff 
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for an unspecified price. Id 
Prior to coming to work for the dealership, Plaintiff entered into an employment contract with 
Ron, whereby Plaintiff agreed to work at the dealership, and Ron agreed to pay Plaintiff for his 
services to the dealership. R Vol. II, p.283 - p.284. There is no dispute in this case that Plaintiff 
bargained for a salary and was, in fact, paid the agreed upon salary throughout his employment at 
Thomas Motors. R. Vol. II, p.285. 
In furtherance of his employment contract with Thomas Motors, Plaintiff had specific 
conversations with Ron regarding his salary. Plaintiff testified: 
Q. Okay. And tell me about any discussions you had before the day you 
actually joined about what salarY you would make. 
A. He told me he would pay me 2,500 bucks a month. 
Q. When were those discussions, how close in time to when you actually 
started? 
A. Probably a month or so because I wouldn't have committed without 
knowing, a month or so prior. He knew that it was less money at the 
time and that it would be a lot of work. And it was, but that it would 
be worth it and it would payoff on me. 
R. Vol. II, p.283 - p.284 (emphasis added). Plaintiff further testified that the salary that was agreed 
to, as part of the employment agreement between himself and Ron, also anticipated incremental 
raises in salary: 
Q. What did you say in response to it? If it was less money than you 
were historically making at the time at Lanny Berg -
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A. It was very much an issue for me, but that he guaranteed me it 
wouldn't last long. Once we got the place going, that I would get an 
incremental raise. He understood that I was not going to make as 
much as I had been, and that it would be a lot of work, but that it 
would payoff. 
Q. But that it was temporary, that the amount, the 2,500 a month was 
temporary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you guys had that discussion, I suppose? 
A. Um-brom. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
R. Vol. II, p.284 (emphasis added). 
Not only did the employment agreement between Plaintiff and Ron call for periodic raises, 
but Plaintiff actually received periodic raises as his responsibilities increased: 
Q. Now, you previously indicated that your dad had talked to you about 
this salary being $2,500 a month, but that it would increase as the 
business got going or something to that effect; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did it eventually increase? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. And how long did it take before it increased? When was your first 
raise, if you recall? 
11 
A. I believe it was after the first year, year and a half maybe, two at the 
most. I'd have to look back on my payroll records. 
* * * 
Q. Then the subsequent year, 1999, it shoots up to an annual salary of 
$58,888, right? 
A. Again, that's correct. 
Q. And, again, is that consistent with what you made in calendar year 
1999? 
A. I believe that is probably correct. 
Q. So it appears, at least by the calendar year 1999, your salary had gone 
back up to approximately where it had been while you were working 
for Lanny Berg; is that fair to say? 
A. It's close, uh-huh, correct. 
R. Vol. II, p.284 - p.285 (emphasis added). In other words, about a year after the Plaintiff started 
working for Thomas Motors, his salary was increased to the same level he had made before joining 
Thomas Motors. 
Approximately 3 years after Plaintiff began working for Thomas Motors, Plaintiff insisted 
that he have written contracts with Defendants covering his current employment and salary, his 
eventnal purchase of Thomas Motors, and the leasing and possible eventual purchase of the land on 
which Thomas Motors operated. R. Vol. II, p.292; R. Vol. II, p. 361. Accordingly, written 
agreements were prepared by an attorney for these purposes. R. Vol. I, p.173. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiff willingly and voluntarily signed the written agreements. R. Vo!' II, p.292 - p.293, R. Vol. 
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II, p.221 - p.223. The attorney who drafted the three agreements was hired and paid by Defendants 
to prepare the documents. R. VoL I, p.173. The documents were formally titled: Agreement for 
Purchase and Sale of Business Assets; Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement; and, 
Management Contract.2 R. Vol. I, p.173 - p.174; 181-223. Of primary importance to this appeal is 
the Management Contract that was executed by Plaintiff. R. Vol. II, p.292 - p.293. Plaintiff himself 
acknowledges that the Management Contract was of primary importance to him: 
Q. Did you have discussions with your dad over any of the terms of these 
written agreements, Exhibits 3, 4, and 5?3 
A. Well, No.4 [the management contract], I believe -- and this is where 
I think some people are confused. This agreement here I vaguely --
I remember this was about my raise. This was about in 2000 when I 
was on vacation in Challis, Idaho, with Heather Strand at her parents' 
2The written agreements Plaintiff signed in September 2000 were quite different than the 
alleged oral agreement Plaintiff had with his father dating back to July of 1997. R. Vol. II, p.299. 
In particular, the written agreements regarding Plaintiff's purchase of Thomas Motors in 
September of2000, were vastly different in several material respects from the oral agreement 
Plaintiff alleges he previously had with his father. Some of the differences include the following: 
1. The written agreement to purchase the assets of Thomas Motors now had a 
specific set price of $850,000. R. Vol. I, p.l84. 
2. The agreements reflected that Plaintiff was no longer going to buy the business 
when Ron retired at or about 63 years old, but would instead take over the 
business just one year later, specifically September 1,2001. R. Vol. I, p.l81. 
3. Part of the written agreements also encompass the plaintiff purchasing land upon 
which the new car dealership known as Thomas Motors was located, and it too 
had a very specific purchase price. R Vol. I, p.l93 - p.l94. 
3In Plaintiff's deposition, Exhibit 3 was the Agreement for Purchase of Sale of Business 
Assets; Exhibit 4 was the Management Contract; and, Exhibit 5 was the Commercial Lease and 
Purchase Agreement. R. Vol. II, p.271. 
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house. And I got the phone call from Ron Thomas crying -
Q. Your dad was crying? 
A. Very, very upset. 
Q. Who was crying? 
A. Ron. Saying the place is falling down around my ears. I need you to 
get back here. You know, just very upset, very -- it upset me a lot to 
be that far away when he was that upset. 
But I said, well, you need to get everybody together, tell them 
what the plan is, and what's going to happen, where we're going with 
this thing. And then when I get back, we'll see where we stand. 
And that's when he got everybody in the showroom, made the 
announcement. That's when this started happening. Rob and Carl got 
this together, so I told him I'd stay. 
And then these were in progress. These were never at the 
same time. This [management contract! was first. This was so I 
knew I had the raise, I knew what my responsibilities were 
supposed to be. These [Agreement for Purchase and Sale of 
Business Assets; Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement) were 
secondary. And I think there is some confusion with everybody on 
that. See, Ron's testimony had said these were all three laid out and 
they signed them. No, that's not correct. This was first; these were 
second. 
Q. The management contract was signed on a date different than 
Exhibits 3 and 5? 
A. To my recollection, yes, sir. 
Q. What date was the management contract signed, Exhibit 4? 
A. I honestly -- I know it had to be on or around that first day of 
September, but I cannot tell you exactly what day. But it was not the 
same time that I signed these. 
This [Management Contract] got the ball rolling to keep 
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me there. This got what Ron perceived to be the ball rolling on how 
to transfer it to me, I suppose, is what he would be looking at. 
Q. So you think the management contract, Exhibit 4, was signed the first 
day of September 2000 or so? 
A. Or so, yes. I believe that's correct. 
R. Vol. II, p.292 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff acknowledges he signed all of the written agreements in September of2000. R. Vol. 
II, p.292; R. Vol. II, p.297. It is noteworthy that Plaintiff claims that Defendants never actually 
signed the Agreement for Purchase of Sale of Business Assets or the Commercial Lease and 
Purchase Agreement (or that Defendants forged their signatures at a later date). R. Vol. II, p.303. 
Plaintiff further claims that Defendants told him that they were not going to hold Plaintiff to the 
written agreements. R. Vol. II, p.302 - p.303. Plaintiff also claims the Agreement for Purchase of 
Sale of Business Assets, and the Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement that he signed, are 
actually not of any binding effect or force upon him.4 R. Vol. II, p.302 - p.303. However, Plaintiff 
4It is interesting to note that Plaintiff openly acknowledges he made no effort to comply 
with any of the requirements imposed upon him by either the Agreement for Purchase and Sale 
of Business Assets, or the Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement: 
Q. Just answer my question. I know you want to make your pitch 
here, but I'm trying to get an answer from your perspective. 
You made no effort to comply with any of the requirements that 
would otherwise have been imposed on you in Exhibits 3 and 5 
after you had that conversation with your dad; is that correct? 
A. That would be accurate. 
R. Vol. II, p. 302 (emphasis added). 
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does not deny the efficacy of the Management Contract. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was 
compensated, fully and completely, for the services that he rendered to Thomas Motors pursuant to 
the terms of the Management Contract. R. Vol. II, p.306; R. Vol. V, p.1 000. 
Despite Plaintiffbeing fully compensated for his services to Thomas Motors, it is undisputed 
that from its inception Thomas Motors was a financial disaster. For most ofthe years that Thomas 
Motors was in existence, it lost money at an alarming rate. R. Vo!' 1, p.174 - p.175, R. Vol. II, p.224 
- p.232. Plaintiff has testified that at the time the business was sold to an investment group in early 
2006, Plaintiff understood the business had approximately $1,000,000 in outstanding debt. R. Vol. 
II, p.317. He also acknowledged his awareness that at one point the dealership was $300,000 "out 
of trust" with the ban1e that provided the loan for the line of credit for the business operation. R. Vol. 
II, p.295. 
Plaintiff even attended a joint meeting in the Fall of 2000 between Thomas Motors' ban1cer 
and Ron to discuss Thomas Motors' very serious financial problems, including the fact that the 
business was "out oftrust" with the line of credit for hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id. Ron has 
testified that Thomas Motors "has been a loser ever since I bought it." R. Vo!' II, p.344. Ron 
testified that he was continually falling behind in his line of credit with the ban1c; that he was putting 
money into Thomas Motors from other sources; and, that Thomas Motors ultimately represented a 
huge drain on his financial resources. R. Vo!' I, p.175 - p.I77, R. Vol. II, p.382. 
Towards the end of the calendar year 2005, Defendants determined they had no choice but 
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to sell Thomas Motors, as it was turning out to be a financial disaster. R. Vol. I, p.l77, R. Vol. II, 
p.382. The company's tax returns confirm the seriousness of Thomas Motors' financial woes. R. 
Vol. II, p.224 - p.232. Most years of Thomas Motors' existence show a loss. The loss in calendar 
year 2005 alone was in excess of $250,000. R. Vol. II, p.232. The financial picture for Thomas 
Motors was so bad that, by the end of2005, Ron was unable to attract any buyers for the business 
so he arranged to put the business up for auction, the effective equivalent of a fire-sale. R. Vol. I, 
p.l77. The business known as Thomas Motors was actually advertised for auction. R. Vol. I, p.l77; 
R. Vol. II, p.383. However, j ust prior to the scheduled auction, the brokerretained by the Defendants 
for the purpose of selling or auctioning off the business approached Ron about a prospective buyer. 
R. Vol. I, p.l77, R. Vol. II, p.382. The business was, in relatively short order, sold to a group of 
investors headed by Mr. Bill Buckner. Id. 
It should be noted that the real estate owned personally by Ron and Elaine Thomas was 
included in the sale of the business to the group headed by Mr. Buckner. R. Vol. I, p.l77 - p.178. 
The entire deal encompassing the sale of the real property, as well as Thomas Motors, to the Buckner 
group totaled $2,900,00. R. Vol. III, p.481 - p.485. However, the undisputed evidence demonstrates 
that the value of Thomas Motors, as part of the entire deal, was an almost negligible amount. Id. 
The transaction involving the sale of the real property and the Thomas Motors dealership was 
finalized in March of 2006. R. Vol. I, p.l77 - p.178. 
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II. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Attorney's fees may be granted on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121 and IA.R. 41. An 
award of attorney's fees is appropriate when this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal 
has been brought or defended frivolously or without foundation. Minich v. Gem State Developers, 
Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1975). When a party on appeaJfails to present any 
significant issue regarding a question of law, where no findings of fact made by the District Court 
were clearly or arguably unsupported by substantial evidence, and where this Court is not asked to 
establish any new legal standards or modifY existing ones, the appeal will be deemed to be 
unreasonable and without foundation. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 95 P.3d 
34 (2004); Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 715, 8 P.3d 1254, 1258 (Ct. App. 
2000). In such a case, an award of attorney's fees is proper. 
As in the Vendelin case, Plaintiff in the preset matter has not presented any significant legal 
question on appeal. Likewise, the District Court below did not err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants. Because Plaintiff s appeal is without merit or foundation, attorney's fees 
should be awarded to Defendants for defending this appeal. 
III. PERTINENT LEGAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
Under Idaho law, a motion for summary judgment should be granted if the court determines 
that no genuine issue of material fact is found to exist after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
and affidavits have been construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the summary 
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judgment. IR.C.P. 56(c). See also, Harris v. State Dept. of Health, 123 Idaho 295 P.2d 1156 
(1992); Farmers Ins. Co. v. Brown, 97 Idaho 380, 544 P.2d 1150 (1976); Salmon Rivers Sportsman 
Camps, Inc. v Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). The nonmoving party is 
entitled to the benefit of all the favorable inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence. 
However, the nonmoving party's case must not rest upon mere speculation, because a mere 
scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 
Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 
808 P .2d 851, 854 (1991). Likewise, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or 
denials of that party's pleadings to avoid summary judgment. IR.C.P. 56(c). See also, Theriault 
v. A.H Robbins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 698 P.2d 365 (1985). The nonmoving party's response must 
set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. IR. c.P. 56( c). 
In addition, summary judgment is appropriate to dismiss a claim when the plaintiff fails to 
submit evidence sufficient to establish an essential element of his claim. See Ambrose v. Buhl Joint 
School Dist. No. 412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (et. App. 1994); Nelson v. City of 
Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,202,911 P.2d 1111,1113 (1996). Facts in dispute cease to be material facts 
when a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. In such a situation, there can be no genuine 
issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 
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771,774,828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The Idaho Supreme Court's review of a District Court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same as that required of the District Court when ruling on the motion. On appellate 
review, this Court must liberally construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. See Friel v. 
Boise City Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 30, 31 (1994). See also, Farm Credit 
Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Harris v. 
Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156,1159 (1992). "If reasonable 
people could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence, the 
motion must be denied." Friel, 126 Idaho at 485, 887 P.2d at 31. If the evidence reveals no 
disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises 
free review. fd. 
IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
The third Count of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges damages against Defendants based upon a 
theory of "Quasi-Contract" in which Plaintiff claims that Defendants were "unjustly enriched." This 
claim fails as a matter ofIdaho law. The District Court correctly applied the law to the undisputed 
facts of this case and properly dismissed Plaintiff's claim for quasi-contract. 
The term quasi-contract is used interchangeably with the term "unjust enrichment" as well 
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as the term "contract implied in law." See e.g., Cannon Builders, Inc. v. Rice, 126 Idaho 616, 888 
P.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995); Matter of Estate ofKeeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d457 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The primary modem designation for these terms is simply unjust enrichment. See Smith v. Smith, 
95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973). 
An action for unjust enrichment is based upon the claim that a defendant has been enriched 
by a plaintiff, and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit conferred by the 
plaintiff without compensating the plaintiff for the value of such benefit. See Gillette v. Storm Circle 
Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 619 P.2d 1116; BHA Investments Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.3d474 
(2003). The party making the claim of unjust enrichment bears the burden of proof, and must 
establish facts showing each of the elements necessary for a claim for unjust enrichment. See Kinzer 
v. Westgate, 129 Idaho 621 (Ct. App. 1997); Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 924 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1994). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has listed the elements of a prima facie claim of unjust enrichment, or quasi-contract, as 
follows: 
The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit is conferred upon 
defendant by plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of the 
benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that 
would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
payment of the value thereof. 
Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 759,133 P.3d 1211 (2006); In re: Estate of Boyd, 134 Idaho 
669,8 P.3d (Ct. App. 2000). 
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A plaintiff claiming that he or she has unjustly enriched another person also bears the burden 
of proving the damages element in support of the cause of action. Under the theory of unjust 
enrichment, or quasi-contract, the measure of damages is not the value of any money, labor or 
materials provided by a plaintiff to a defendant; rather, the measure of damages is "the amount of 
benefit defendant received which would be unjust for defendant to retain." Toews v. Funk, 129 
Idaho 316, 322, 924 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1994). In other words, when dealing with damages, the 
focus in a claim for unjust enrichment is on the value of benefit actually realized by the defendant 
which in good conscience it would be unfair for the defendant to retain without making remuneration 
to the plaintiff. See Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994); 
Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 322, 924 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1994). 
However, there are certain circumstances under which a claim for unjust enrichment must 
fail as a matter of law. Idaho law is very clear that a recovery for unjust enrichment cannot be had 
"where there is an enforceable express contract already covering the same subject matter." Blaser 
v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012,829 P.2d l361 (Ct. App. 1991). See also, Marshall v. Bear, 107 Idaho 
201,687 P.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1984). Furthermore, "[e]quity does not intervene when an express 
contract prescribes the right to compensation." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 
558,165 P.3d 261,272 (2007). See also, Shacocass, Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 116 Idaho 460, 
464,776 P.2d 469,473 (Ct. App. 1989); Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064,695 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (1984). 
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In the present case, the essence of Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim, is that he alleges that 
he worked long and hard hours at Thomas Motors. Plaintiff alleges he worked these long hours for 
several years at a lower-than-normal salary based upon the promise of one day becoming the owner 
of Thomas Motors. What Plaintiff fails to acknowledge is that Plaintiff had an express contract 
covering his employment with Defendants. Plaintiff s express employment contract is separate and 
apart from Plaintiffs alleged claim for the transfer of Thomas Motors to him. It is undisputed that 
Plaintiff went to work at Thomas Motors from 1997 through early 2006, and that Plaintiff was paid 
a salary, as well as substantial benefits, for such services. Plaintiff is now, in retrospect, unhappy 
with the salary he received for his services to Thomas Motors, and seeks to re-write his employment 
contract. 
1. Plaintiff Had an Express Contract Governing His Salary When He 
Began Working For Thomas Motors in 1997. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff had an express employment contract with Thomas Motors 
pursuant to which he agreed to work at Thomas Motors, and Thomas Motors agreed to pay him for 
such services. There is also no dispute that Plaintiff was, in fact, paid his agreed upon salary, and 
benefits, throughont the entire time he was employed at Thomas Motors. Moreover, it is undisputed 
that about a year and a half into working for Thomas Motors, Plaintiff was given salary raises such 
that he was making as much or more than he had previously made at any point in his working life. 
R. Vol. II, p.285. 
Plaintiff s argument for unjust enrichment fails to account for the fact that there are two 
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agreements at issue in this matter. First, between the time the dealership was purchased in 1997, 
until 2000, there was an express oral contract that governed Plaintiff s employment compensation. 
Second, there was an entirely separate alleged agreement governing the transfer of Thomas Motors 
(albeit an unenforceable contract due to the absence of several material terms). Regarding the 
alleged agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff, Plaintiff testified: 
Q. Now, you have filed a lawsuit here against your mom and dad 
alleging, in essence, that he had made a promise to you to give you 
the dealership, right? 
A. He had made a promise to me that upon his retirement, that the 
dealership would be mine. 
Q. And are those kind of the words that you remember him saying? 
A. Amongst others. 
Q. Well, let's review them all then. Because what I'm hearing you say-
A. I'll do my best. 
Q. Thank you. 
What I'm hearing you say is your dad, you can specifically 
recall words to the effect of, "Drew, if you come over, when I retire, 
the business will be yours," right? 
A. The dealership will be yours. 
Q. The dealership will be yours. 
Is that pretty close to at least paraphrasing the words he used? 
A. That would be fairly accurate. 
* * * 
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Q. Okay. You're claiming here that your dad made an agreement with 
you before you joined Thomas Motors that the dealership would be 
yours on his retirement, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That's the substance of your allegation in this case: is that fair to say? 
A. That's fair. 
Q. Okay. So I'm going to now try to elicit from you -- tell me everything 
you can remember about specific words used by your dad that in your 
mind amounted to that agreement that we haven't talked about so far. 
A. I believe we've talked about anything he has said through the years up 
to the date he sold it, that hang in there, stay in there, it's your place. 
I don't want the place. It's your place. 
Q. Okay. That's after you joined? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But prior to that, it was work it hard, keep your head down, it will be 
yours. It's your place. 
Q. So have you, then, told me essentially all you can remember in the 
way of specific words used by your dad that amounted to this 
agreement that's at issue in this lawsuit? 
A. I'd have to say yes. 
R. Vol. II, p.283 - p.284 (emphasis added). According to Plaintiff, the sum total of the alleged 
agreement for the transfer of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff was that ifhe came to work for Thomas 
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Motors, one day Thomas Motors would be transferred to him. 
However, the transfer of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff was not going to come without a price. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff knew he was going to have to pay a separate price to Defendants to 
purchase the dealership. R. Vol. II, p.294; R. Vol. II, p.298 - p.299. Plaintiff testified: 
Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I was going to get this 
place for free. This place was - we came in together, him and 1. He had the money. 
I had the - I believe the talent and the time and the tenacity to get in there and do 
whatever it took to make this place work. 
When and up to the time he retires, I expected to cut him and her a check -
R. Vol. II, p.294. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the agreement to transfer Thomas Motors to 
Plaintiff was a discrete transaction according to Plaintiff s own testimony. Nonetheless, the District 
Court noted that the agreement for the sale of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff was lacking in its material 
terms, and it was unenforceable. Plaintiff has not appealed this ruling by the District Court. 
Apart from the alleged agreement regarding the future sale of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff also had various conversations with Ron regarding the amount of salary Plaintiff would be 
paid for his employment services. These employment negotiations culminated in an express 
employment agreement whereby Plaintiff agreed that he would work for Thomas Motors, and in 
return Thomas Motors agreed to pay Plaintiff a salary. It is important to note that the ~ was not 
tied in any way to the eventual transfer of Thomas Motors to Plaintiff: 
Q. Okay. And tell me about any discussions you had before the day you 
actually joined about what salary you would make. 
A. He told me he would pay me 2,500 bucks a month. 
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Q. When were those discussions, how close in time to when you actually 
started? 
A. Probably a month or so because I wouldn't have committed without 
knowing, a month or so prior. He knew that it was less money at the 
time and that it would be a lot of work. And it was, but that it would 
be worth it and it would payoff on me. 
Q. He knew it would be less money? How would he know that? 
A. Because he knew what I was making at Lanny Berg. 
Q. I assume the only way he could know that is you telling him? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you told him how much you were making at Lanny Berg? 
A. More than once. He was very proud of me for that. 
Q. And when -- in your mind was it him that decided the $2,500 a month 
salary? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. Is that yes? 
A. Yes, that is. 
R. Vol. II, p.284 (emphasis added). 
In other words, Ron offered Plaintiff a salary for working at Thomas Motors, and Plaintiff 
accepted the salary. Furthermore, Plaintiff negotiated for, and received, periodic raises in his salary 
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for the work that he was performing: 
Q. What did you say in response to it? If it was less money than you 
were historically making at the time at Lanny Berg -
A. It was very much an issue for me, but that he guaranteed me it 
wouldn't last long. Once we got the place going, that I would get an 
incremental raise. He understood that I was not going to make as 
much as I had been, and that it would be a lot of work, but that it 
would payoff. 
Q. But that it was temporary, that the amount, the 2,500 a month was 
temporary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you guys had that discussion, I suppose? 
A. Um-hmm. 
Q. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have any discussion along the lines of, well, how 
temporary, for how long? 
A. You know, I can't specifically remember setting a time frame on it. 
I was, in my mind, thinking hopefully it would only be a year and 
then you'll be able to have a raise because it's pretty difficult to live 
on almost half of what I was making, but I was willing to make the 
leap and dig in and try to do what we had to do. 
R. Vol. II, p.284 (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did receive several raises throughout his employment with 
Thomas Motors. R. Vol. II, p.284 - p.285. Plaintiff started at a monthly salary of $2,500 
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(approximately $30,000 per year). Within about a year and a half, Plaintiff was earning a yearly 
salary of$58,888 per year. In other words, within about a year and half, Plaintiff was making every 
bit as much as he had previously been making at Lanny Berg: 
Q. Then the subsequent year, 1999, it shoots up to an annual salary of 
$58,888, right? 
A. Again, that's correct. 
Q. And, again, is that consistent with what you made in calendar year 
1999? 
A. I believe that is probably correct. 
Q. So it appears, at least by the calendar year 1999. your salary had gone 
back up to approximately where it had been while you were working 
for Lanny Berg; is that fair to say? 
A. It's close, uh-huh, correct. 
Q. And then it also appears to me -- just go through the subsequent 
years, without reviewing every one of them, that you're making close 
to the same salary on an annual basis with a couple of spikes here and 
there. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Is that fair to say? 
A. It is fair to say. I believe part of the money from the '99 Social 
Security earnings statement here was partly Ron and my salary and 
the other was Chrysler. Chrysler also pays -- I don't know if you want 
to call it bonus money, but Chrysler pays money on objectives that 
you achieve. They send you a separate 1099 for that. So there is a 
combined income there. It's not just all Thomas Motors. 
29 
Q. But it would still be moneys associated with your employment at 
Thomas Motors? 
A. Yes. 
R. Vol. II, p.285 (emphasis added). 
The above point is raised because Plaintiff has claimed that when he first went to work for 
Thomas Motors, Plaintifftook the job offer at a "greatly reduced salary." Appellant's Brief, p. 15. 
Whatever the truth of that may be, it is undisputed that in less than two years into his employment 
with Thomas Motors Plaintiff was making every bit as much as he had ever made in his entire wage 
earning life. R. Vol. II, p. 285. Furthermore, Plaintiff s salary was certainly commensurate with the 
monies he had been making at his prior employer, Lmmy Berg Chevrolet. Id. 
More important, however, is the fact that Plaintiff agreed to accept a salary from his 
employer, and Plaintiffs employer actually paid him the agreed upon salary pursuant to his express 
employment agreement. While Plaintiff does not specifY precisely what "benefit" was purportedly 
received by Defendants that it would be inequitable for them to retain, it appears that the only 
possible benefit thatthe Defendants received from Plaintiff while he worked at Thomas Motors, was 
the benefit of Plaintiffs employment services. However, Plaintiff was actually paid for his 
employment services on the terms that he had agreed to. In other words, there was an express 
contract already in place regarding the supposed "benefit" Plaintiff now claims to have bestowed 
upon Defendants, nmnely the employment contract pursuant to which Plaintiff was paid the agreed 
upon salary. As such, Plaintiff is clearly barred by Idaho law from making any kind of claim for 
unjust enrichment arising out of his employment services with Thomas Motors. See Vanderford, 144 
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Idaho at 558,165 P.3d at 272. 
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he bestowed a benefit upon Defendants outside 
of his express employment agreement that would be inequitable for Defendants to retain. Plaintiff 
never contributed any monies to Thomas Motors at any point. Plaintiff did not assume any of the 
financial risks associated with the purchase of Thomas Motors. On the contrary, while Plaintiffwas 
the general sales manager of Thomas Motors, the business lost vast sums of money in 7 of its 9 years 
of existence. It is undisputed that Defendants are the ones who actually lost every cent of those 
monies. R. Vol. I, p.l74 - p.175. Plaintiff had an express employment contract with Defendants 
regarding his services to Thomas Motors. That employment contract was separate and apart from 
the agreement involving the transfer of Thomas Motors. Because the benefit provided to Defendants 
by Plaintiff was Plaintiff s employment services, for which there was an express contract, Plaintiff s 
claim for unjust enrichment must fail. 
2. Plaintiff Renegotiated an Express Written Employment Contract With 
Thomas Motors for His Employment in 2000 and Beyond. 
Beyond Plaintiff s orally negotiated employment contract for the years 1997-1999, in the year 
2000, Plaintiff renegotiated his salary and duties with Thomas Motors and actually signed a written 
managerial contract with Thomas Motors. The execution of the Management Contract was a 
condition of Plaintiffs continued employment with Thomas Motors that was actually demanded by 
Plaintiff. R. Vol. II, p.292; R. Vol. II, p. 361. According to Plaintiff, in the summer of 2000, he was 
vacationing in Challis, Idaho. R. Vol. II, p.292. l.4. Ron called Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff to return 
to Emmett to assist with some problems at Thomas Motors. Id. Plaintiff agreed to return, but only 
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on the condition that Ron make an announcement to Thomas Motors' employees and put together 
the requisite paperwork regarding Plaintiffs continued employment and the future sale of Thomas 
Motors. Id 
After this conversation with Plaintiff, Ron hired attorney Carl Harder to draft the purchase 
and sale agreement for Thomas Motors, as well as the Management Contract. R. Vol. I, p.173 -
p.!74. The Management Contract set forth the employment rights and obligations as between 
Plaintiff and Thomas Motors. R. Vol. II, p.22! - p.223. The Management Contract included such 
terms as Plaintiff s job title, Plaintiff s job responsibilities, Plaintiff s compensation, and Plaintiff s 
duty to report to the shareholders, among other things. Id Plaintiff has testified that the parties 
signed the Management Contract on approximately the first day of September 2000. R. Vol. II, 
p.292-93; p. 296-97. The remaining documents were signed by Plaintiff sometime later in 
September 2000. 
It should be noted that Plaintiff disputes that the Agreement For Purchase and Sale of 
Business Assets and the Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement, were signed by Defendants 
in September 2000. Instead, Plaintiff is making the rather outlandish accusation that Defendants 
actually signed these two agreements years after the fact (notwithstanding Defendants' testimony that 
they both signed and dated these agreements in September of2000). Of course, Defendants dispute 
the factual assertions made by Plaintiff concerning the signing of the Agreement for Purchase and 
Sale of Business Assets, and the Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement. 
However, it does not appear from the record that Plaintiff is claiming that Defendants did not 
execute the Management Contract. In fact, Plaintiffs testimony is to the contrary. R. Vol. II., P 292-
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93. Nonetheless, whether Defendants executed the Management Contract is of no consequence to 
the issues presented by this appeal. It is undisputed that Plaintiff actually signed the Management 
Contract. Even if this Court determines that a factual issue exists regarding whether the 
Management Contract was validly executed by all parties, the existence of the Management Contract, 
executed by Plaintiff, makes it clear that Plaintiff's employment was the subject of negotiation, that 
ultimately resulted in an express contract that was reduced to writing. It is important to remember 
that the Management Contract came into existence in the first place only upon the insistence of 
Plaintiff 
Furthermore, the employment negotiations, as reflected in the Management Contract did not 
make the transfer of Thomas Motors a condition of employment that would in any way affect the pay 
level of Plaintiffs salary. It is also undeniable and undisputed that Plaintiff was actually paid his 
compensation pursuant to the Management Contract that he both negotiated and signed: 
Q. Well, one thing that was enacted under this management contract is 
the amount that it talked about as your compensation. You were paid 
that amount thereafter? 
A. My salary? 
Q. Right. 
Q. So at least that part of the management contract was continuing, 
ongoing, agreed to and followed up with? 
A. I believe that was in the same time frame, but by the time that Carl 
Harder was no longer with us and this never came back to me in any 
way, shape or form as far as copies and --
33 
Q. All I'm asking about is one of the things this management contract 
says is what your salary is going to be from that date forward? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was in fact your salary from that date forward? 
A. I believe that's right. 
R. Vol. V., p. 1000 (emphasis added). In other words, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had an express 
employment contract with Defendants. Plaintiff was compensated fully and fairly for his 
employment services pursuant to that contract. Id In fact, Plaintiff continued to receive his 
negotiated salary for the remainder of his employment with Thomas Motors.5 
In Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff basically alleges that the purported "benefit" inequitably 
received by Defendants was Plaintiffs efforts in working extra hard and allegedly being underpaid 
as an employee for his efforts. Plaintiff does not, however, address the fact that this type of alleged 
benefit does not give rise to a claim for unjust enrichment as a matter of law. Idaho law clearly 
provides that a party cannot make recovery for unjust enrichment "where there is an enforceable 
express contract already covering the same subject matter." See Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 
144 Idaho 547, 558, 165 P.3d 261,272 (2007)(emphasis added). See also, Blaser v. Cameron, 121 
5It is notable that Idaho Code § 45-610 would require Defendants to notifY Plaintiff prior 
to reducing his salary from what had been negotiated in the Management Contract. Plaintiff does 
not claim that his salary was ever reduced, nor that he received allY notice that his salary would 
be reduced. The undisputed evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff bargained for his salary 
and received his "bargained-for" salary from the date the Management Contract was signed until 
Thomas Motors was sold. R. Vol. V., p.l 000. Nothing in the Management Contract rendered 
Plaintiffs receipt of salary, Defendants' payment of salary, or the amount of Plaintiffs salary 
dependent upon the future transfer of the automobile dealership. 
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Idaho 1012, 829 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1991); Marshall v. Bear, 107 Idaho 201, 687 P.2d 591 (Ct. 
App. 1984); Triangle Min. Co., Inc., v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 753 F.2d 734 (9th Idaho 1985). 
"Equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to compensation." 
Vanderford, 144 Idaho at 558,165 P.3d at 272 (emphasis added). 
Regardless of whether plaintiff believes he was underpaid for his employment services, it is 
undisputed that he had an employment agreement with Thomas Motors for an agreed upon salary, 
and that Plaintiff was paid that salary. R. Vol. V, p.l000; R. Vol. II, p.300. There was an existing 
contract that was in place covering the very same subject matter that is at issue in this unjust 
emichment claim. Simply put, Plaintiff is legally precluded from seeking additional compensation 
for his employment services for which he was already paid, based upon a theory of quasi-contract. 
This type of rule only makes sense. Any other rule of law would open the litigation floodgates for 
disgruntled employees, who were promised a specific wage for their services, to seek greater 
retroactive compensation for their employment on the basis that they "worked harder" than other 
similar employees. The law of unjust emichment was certainly never intended to allow such results, 
which is why the law disallows unjust emichment claims when there is an already existing contract 
in place to cover the same subject matter at issue. 
As a matter of interest, Appellant's Brief cites to Harbaugh v. Myron Harbaugh Motor, Inc. , 
100 Idaho 295, 597 P.2d 18 (1979) as supportive of his claim for unjust emichment. The Harbaugh 
case is completely inapposite to the subject of unjust emichment that is at issue in this matter. The 
Harbaugh case does not even involve a claim for unjust emichment. In Harbaugh, the plaintiffs' 
father owned several businesses. Id. at 298,597 P.2d at 21. The plaintiffs claimed that they left 
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promising careers in other fields to take control of their father's business based upon their father's 
promise that his business would ultimately be transferred to them. Id. The plaintiffs further claimed 
that in addition to their salary, they were to receive certain credits from the business's net profits 
which would accrue towards the eventual purchase of the business. Id. There were no written 
documents of this alleged agreement. Id. 
Eventually, the plaintiffs' father died. Their father's widow denied that such an agreement 
existed. Id. The widow maintained that the plaintiffs were merely employees of the business and 
that they were not entitled to any accrued credits for the future acquisition of the business. Id. 
However, the office manager for their father's business testified that the plaintiffs' father had 
informed her of the "salary plus accrued credit compensation scheme," and that the credits were to 
be used later in the purchase of the business. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim 
on summary judgment, apparently ruling that no contract existed which would give the plaintiffs 
credits toward the purchase of the business. Id. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
district court, finding that it was impossible to hold, as a matter of law, that no contract for the 
purchase of the business was entered into. Harbaugh, 100 Idaho at 298 .. The Supreme Court then 
remanded for further findings. Id. 
The Harbaugh case simply bears no relation to the facts of the case presently before the 
Court. First, in Harbaugh, the plaintiffs were suing for damages for breach of contract, i.e., that they 
should be permitted to purchase the business at a reduced cost due to their accrued credits. In the 
instant case, Plaintiff is not suing for breach of contract damages. Although breach of contract was 
one of Plaintiff's original causes of action, the District Court dismissed the claim, and Plaintiff did 
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not appeal this ruling. Second, in Harbaugh, the plaintiffs did not ask for damages for unjust 
enrichment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of unjust enrichment as it 
related to the plaintiffs' employment with their father's business. However, there are courts that 
have addressed the issue of unjust enrichment as it relates to employment situations similar to the 
one in the present case. 
For example, the case Ingram v. Rencor Controls, Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 12 (D. Me. 2003) 
presents an almost identical situation to the present case. In Ingram, the plaintiffbegan working as 
a regional sales representative for the defendant corporation. Id. at 13. The plaintiff's duties required 
him to maintain and grow the business, specifically by increasing sales, bringing in employees, and 
managing the office. Id. at 14. At one point during the plaintiff's employment, one of the key 
shareholders of the defendant corporation quit. Id. The plaintiff became concerned about the 
viability of the company and considered leaving his employment with the defendant corporation. 
Id 
The remaining owner of the defendant corporation, Mr. Herlihy, sought to keep the plaintiff 
as an employee and had discussions with the plaintiff regarding the conditions under which the 
plaintiff would continue his employment with the defendant corporation. Id. The plaintiff stated 
that he would remain with defendant corporation only ifhe received a salary increase of more than 
50%, a corporate officership, and a 10% share of stock in the company. Id. The parties then agreed 
that the plaintiff's salary would be raised to $100,000 and that he would be promoted to vice 
president ifhe stayed with the company. It was also communicated to the plaintiff that a transfer of 
10% ofthe shares in the defendant corporation "was a fair amount." Id. 
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According to the plaintiff, the raise, the promotion to vice president, and the delivery to him 
of 10% of the stock in the company comprised the entire agreement between himself and Mr. 
Herlihy. Id. Mr. Herlihy asserted that the parties never reached an agreement on the stock transfer 
and that they only discussed the possibility of such a transfer. Id. The parties did not memorialize 
any agreement in writing and no notes were made. Id. However, both the plaintiff and Mr. Herlihy 
understood that the stock could not be issued until a dispute with the previous shareholder was 
resolved, which could be as long as two years. Id. at 15. 
Mr. Herlihy and the plaintiff would meet on a yearly basis to discuss and fix the terms of the 
plaintiffs employment. The plaintiff did not ever receive his 10 percent share of stock in the 
defendant company. Eventually, the plaintiff resigned, after which he sued the defendant corporation 
for, among other things, breach of contract for the failure to issue the stock shares. The Ingram court 
dismissed the contractual claim for the 10% stock transfer. The Ingram court then proceeded to 
analyze the plaintiffs claim for damages based upon unjust enrichment.Id. at 22. The Ingram court 
first identified the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment (which are identical to the elements for 
unjust enrichment in Idaho). Id. The Ingram court next recognized, as does Idaho, that "the 
existence of a contractual relationship precludes recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment." Id. 
The Ingram court recognized that the controlling issue was whether the plaintiff and the 
defendant had an express employment relationship that would prevent the plaintiff from prevailing 
on a claim of unjust enrichment. The court first acknowledged that the plaintiff had been 
"compensated in this case, and he has been compensated pursuant to a valid employment contract, 
albeit an oral one." Id. at 23. Furthermore, the plaintiff continued to receive raises in his salary. The 
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plaintiff did not argue that he did not receive his agreed-upon salary. Id The plaintiff argued that 
he did not receive the stock transfer allegedly agreed to by the parties as part of the overall 
agreement. 
The Ingram court acknowledged that the parties disputed the existence of an agreement 
granting the plaintiff a 10% share in the defendant corporation. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the 
plaintiff's employment agreement precluded him from recovery of the stock shares. The court stated 
the following: 
Although it seems harsh to deny Plaintiff this form of compensation if, in fact, he 
was promised it, the Court carmot allow recovery "[wJhere the parties have made a 
contract for themselves, covering the whole subject matter." Allowing recovery under 
a theory of unjust enrichment "would then be an impermissible end run around a 
voluntary structuring of relationships and their consequences." Therefore, Plaintiffs 
claim of unjust enrichment with respect to the stock transfer fails." 
Id at 24. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in the present matter, Plaintiff and Defendants had a valid and enforceable 
employment agreement. In 1997, Plaintiff was offered a monthly salary of $2,500, as well as 
benefits, to act as general manager for Thomas Motors. Plaintiff accepted the offer and was paid 
according to the agreement. Roughly a year and a hal flater, in 1999, Plaintiff received a substantial 
raise in his salary for his employment services. Plaintiff accepted the raise and continued to work 
as general manager for Thomas Motors, at a salary rate commensurate with as much as he had ever 
made in his working life (while working in towns larger than Emmett, Idaho). In 2000, Plaintiff 
demanded a written Management Contract. The Management Contract expressly set forth the terms 
of Plaintiff's employment, including Plaintiff's responsibilities, and included an additional raise in 
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compensation. Plaintiff signed the agreement. It is undisputed that, thereafter, Plaintiff was paid 
according to the agreement. R. Vol. V, p.lOOO. The agreement did not provide for additional 
compensation if Plaintiff worked extra-hard or put in long hours. 
Plaintiff now apparently regrets the employment contract he agreed to. Plaintiff alleges he 
provided substantially more value to Thomas Motors than what he was compensated for6• As a result 
Plaintiff seeks damages for such unjust eurichment. Plaintiff s argument in this regard is troubling 
on a number of levels. First, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge that damages for unjust enrichment are 
based upon an implied-in-law contract, or quasi-contract. This type of fictional contract will only 
be found to exist in the absence of an express contract. As set forth above, it is undisputed that 
Plaintiff entered into, and was compensated for, an express employment contract with Thomas 
Motors. 
The second troubling aspect of Plaintiff s argument, is that it would open up the door for a 
flood of disgruntled employees to sue their employers for the perceived value oftheir work, rather 
than the bargained-for contractual value of their work. Taken to its logical extension, Plaintiffs 
theory of recovery in this regard would permit any employee who simply claims that he or she 
worked "extra hard" for his or her employer to maintain an action for unjust enrichment. Such an 
argument should fail for obvious reasons. In the present matter, Plaintiff had an express contract of 
employment. He was paid pursuant to that contract. Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment must 
6 While plaintiffloosely refers to an unjust enrichment claim against "the Defendants," 
the "benefit" for employment services would obviously be to the employer, Thomas Motors, Inc., 
not the individual defendants. 
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fail. The Court should affirm the District Court's order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING DEFENDANTS THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
1. Standard of Review. 
In Idaho, when an action is brought to recover damages pursuant to a commercial transaction, 
attorney's fees must be awarded to the prevailing party. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) states: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing !lady shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be 
set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (1998) (emphasis added). The statute means just what it says, that attorney 
fees "shall" be awarded. This Court has repeatedly held that "Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an 
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a suit involving a commercial transaction." Hayden 
Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 313, 109 P.3d 161, 167 (2005). See also, 
Tentinger v. McPheters, 132 Idaho 620, 624, 977 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that 
"Attorney'S fees are mandatory for actions to recover on a contract relating to the purchase of 
services or any commercial transaction pursuant to Ie. 12-120(3)." 
In the present matter, there is no dispute on appeal that Plaintiff s Complaint presented issues 
relating to a commercial transaction. Likewise, there is no dispute on appeal that Defendants were 
the prevailing party, having achieved a dismissal on each of Plaintiffs causes of action. 
Accordingly, attorney's fees must be awarded to Defendants in this action. The District Court did 
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not err in determining that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate. 
2. The District Court Understood the Requirements of Rule 54(e) and 
Made a Reasoned Decision within the Outer Boundaries of Its 
Discretion. 
As stated above, Plaintiff does not argue on appeal that the District Court erred in awarding 
Defendants their attorney's fees. Rather, Plaintiff appeals the amount of fees actually awarded by 
the District Court and requests a reduction in the amount of attorney's fees awarded. In sum, the 
Plaintiff complains that "the District Court's award of fees in this case was unreasonable and 
excessive and must be reduced." Appellant's Brief, p. 21. 
Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) the prevailing party is entitled to a "reasonable attorney fee." 
Daisy Mftg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,262-63,999 P.2d 914, 917-18 (Ct. App. 
2000). See also, Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 811 P.2d 48, 48,52 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating 
that the court must act consistent with JR. C. P. 54(e )(3) in the determination of reasonable attorney 
fees). Furthermore, the District Court is required to base its determination of reasonableness upon 
Rule 54(e)(3), which sets forth numerous factors which the court must take into account when 
making an award of attorney's fees. The Rule states: 
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it shall 
consider the following factors in determining the amoIDlt of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability ofthe attorney in the particular field oflaw. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances 
of the case. 
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(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) A wards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted 
Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing 
a party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
IR.e.P 54(e)(3). 
Lastly, the District Court has discretion in determining a reasonable attorney fee pursuant to 
54(e)(3). See Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 47, 896 P.2d 949, 955 
(1995) (stating that the "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial 
court"); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 118 Idaho 769, 784, 800 P.2d 656,671 (1990). 
Upon appeal, "An award of attorney fees under Ie. § 12-120(3) is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion." P.a. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 
870,876 (2007). See also, Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 712, 52 PJd 848,857 
(2002). This Court applies a three part test to determine whether the District Court abused its 
discretion. These three factors include: 
Id. 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
In the present case, the decision of the District Court satisfies all of the requirements under 
Rule 54( e). The District Court first recognized that the calculation of reasonable attorney fees was 
within its discretion. R. Vol. VI, p.1176. The District Court further acknowledged that it was 
43 
required to consider each and every factor set forth in Rule 54(e)(3). R. Vol. VI, p.l176. In the 
instant case, Defendants' attorneys presented the District Court with a comprehensive brief setting 
forth the time spent on each issue in this case, the amount charged by each attorney assisting on the 
case, and an affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of the rates charged. R. Vol. VI, p.l 092 -
p.1129. Defendants further provided the District Court with a detailed analysis of the fees charged 
in this matter as they related to each of the elements contained in Rule 54(e )(3). R. Vol. VI, p.1125 -
p.l128. It is noteworthy, that Defendants did not actually submit all of the fees incurred by 
Defendants in defending Plaintiffs claims. Tr. Vol. I, p.150, 1. 18 - p.l52, 104. 
In arriving at its opinion, the District Court stated that it had, in fact, considered each of the 
factors listed in 54(e)(3). Specifically, the District Court stated the following: 
After considering the record in this action and applying the factors set forth 
in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court awards Defendants attorney fees in the amount of 
$115,749.20. Although Plaintiff objects to the reasonableness of the attorney fees, 
Defendants were in the position that they had to respond to and defend against the 
litigation driven by the Plaintiff. A very significant amount of time and labor had to 
be expended by Defendants to conduct discovery, to respond to the activity of 
Plaintiff s counsel, and to raise the matters Defendants believed were important. 
From the Court's own perspective, this case has demanded a significant amount of 
time on a myriad of matters. The Court certainly cannot find that Defendants were 
wasteful in their approach to this litigation, caused unnecessary expense, or were not 
reasonable in the way they conducted this lawsuit. The Court finds that the attorney 
fees claimed by the Defendants are reasonable. 
R. Vol. VI, p.ll77 -78 (emphasis added). Plaintiff is critical of the District Court's analysis since, 
in Plaintiff s estimation, none of the issues in this case were novel or complex. While the novelty 
or difficulty of the questions involved in a case is one factor under Rule 54( e )(3), the District Court 
based its decision upon all twelve factors enumerated in the Rule. Contrary to Plaintiff s argument, 
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it is not necessary for the District Court to delineate its reasoning, within the four corners of its 
memorandum, with respect to each individual factor in Rule 54( e )(3): 
Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court to make specific findings in the 
record. only to consider the stated factors in determining the amount of the fees. 
When considering the factors, courts need not demonstrate how they employed any 
of those factors in reaching an award amount. 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185 P.3d 258, 262 (2008) (quoting Smith v. Mitton, 140 
Idaho 893, 902,104 P.3d 367,376 (2004». 
In this instance, the District Court clearly perceived the award of attorney fees as 
discretionary. The District Court properly acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the applicable legal standards. The District Court arrived at its decision by an 
exercise of reason based upon the Rule 54( e )(3) factors, as well as the information submitted to it 
by the parties. Plaintiff now urges this Court to simply replace the District Court's finding with its 
own determination of reasonableness. Such a position is not consistent with the Idaho Supreme 
Court's review of discretionary matters. "To determine if the district court abused its discretion, this 
Court focuses on the process by which the district court reached its decision." Palmer v. Spain, 138 
Idaho 798, 800, 69 P.3d 1059, 1061 (2003)(emphasis added). It is obvious from the record that the 
District Court in this matter religiously followed the proper process for an award of attorney's fees. 




For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court affinn the rulings 
of the District Court and award Defendants costs and attorneys' fees for this appeal. 
DATED this ;>';I~ay of March, 2010. 
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